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‘Causa efficiens’ vs. ‘Causa finalis’: functional explanations in biology 
Biology differs from most sciences in its particular way of dealing with the term ‘function’. On the 
one hand, questions like ‘What is the function of a trait?’ seem to be perfectly legitimate, realizing 
that (most) biologists acknowledge that “function is a concept that to this day remains indispensable 
to biology” (Keller, 2010: 19). On the other hand functional explanations, along with intentional 
explanations, generally have one main disadvantage in common: they are teleological or seem to 
invoke a ‘causa finalis’. As a consequence, they are not in line with scientific practice of explaining 
causality in terms of a ‘causa efficiens’. Moreover, they are untestable (Hempel, 1965) and often 
tend to lead to storytelling in evolutionary biology (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Buller, 2005), rather 
than to a sound scientific approach. As a reaction, efforts were made to demystify and/or naturalize 
functional explanations in biology. Two opposite approaches are generally distinguished: historical 
and a-historical accounts of function. Historical approaches contain views such as Wright’s account of 
functions (Wright), proper function theory (Millikan, 1989), and the etiological approach (Perlman, 
2010; Buller, 1999). Examples of a-historical accounts are systemic approach (Cummins, 1975), goal 
contribution approach (Nagel, 1961; Boorse, 1976) and life chances approach (Bigelow and Pargetter, 
1987; Wimsatt, 1972). Both historical and a-historical approaches meet a number of problems. To 
top it all, attempts to unify (Kitcher, 1993; Walsh, 1996), purify (Cummins & Roth, 2010) and 
instantiate (Griffiths, 1993) have only increased the amount of theories on functional explanations, 
making it even more difficult to maintain a clear view on the matter and the problems surrounding it. 
Attempts to introduce a pluralistic account, such as Wouters (2005), have tried to identify ways in 
which the term function is used in connection with the study of living organisms; trying to grasp how 
biologists appeal to function. Although promising, his account is lacking to certain extents, such as his 
central focus on intuitions as a guideline for function debate. In this paper, attempts are made to 
reconcile or combine the advantages of the accounts mentioned, avoiding the problems (e.g. 
function/malfunction distinction, promiscuity of function-objection, causal asymmetry, function-
setting history) these accounts are faced with. 
This paper contributes to the causality/explanation (in biology) debate in at least three ways: First 
off, a comprehensive overview of the existing accounts and approaches to functional explanation in 
biology will be given, which is missing in the literature, rendering some contemporary discussions 
superfluous. Secondly, a bottom-up framework able to deal with functional explanation in scientific 
practice will be presented, guided by answers to central questions, such as ‘Are we to choose 
between accounts?’ and ‘Are the proposed accounts incompatible and/or excluding?’. Thirdly, in 
view of the topic of the conference, special attention will be given to the teleological character of 
functional explanation, addressing the scientific merits and/or pitfalls of causality-debate in terms of 
‘causa finalis’. 
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